RECTA FINAL EN LA NEGOCIACIÓ SOBRE LA INDEPENDÈNCIA DE KOSOVO

En anteriors posts ja he fet referència a la cada cop més propera accessió a la independència de Kosovo, així com a l'actitud dels ecspanyols al respecte (vegeu 1, 2, 3, 4 i 5). Amb el cas de Montenegro feliçment solucionat, sembla arribada l'hora de Kosovo.

Al llarg d'aquesta setmana que tot just estem a punt d'acabar, s'han iniciat les negociacions entorn el futur estatus polític de Kosovo, entre les delegacions del govern de Kosovo i el de Sèrbia. Sobre la taula hi ha la proposta elaborada per l'enviat especial del Secretari General de l'ONU per a Kosovo, el finès Martti Ahtisaari. Qui estigui interessat en aprofundir al respecte, li suggereixo que llegeixi els quatre articles que he publicat a Llibertat.cat (1, 2, 3, 4).

En el decurs de la meva navegació per internet sobre aquest tema, he trobat un informe elaborat per un analista, anònim, de la UE sobre el posicionament de la comunitat internacional respecte aquest tema. Concretament, l'autor fa un repàs país per país de la UE, sobre el seu posicionament entorn la independència kosovar. També hi ha referències a altres estats no europeus. És un informe publicat el passat dia 21 pel diari kosovar Koha Ditore). Penso que és molt interessant. L'he penjat íntegrament aquí.

A continuació passo a reproduir alguns fragments que em semblen interessants.

1. "Spain has reservations regarding Kosovo’s independence due to its fear of Kosovo's independence legitimising secessionist aspirations in its Basque and Catalan regions. Currently, the idea of secession does not enjoy a majority in any of these two regions, however, they fear this could change in the future".

2. "Germany wants to serve as a “bridge” between the West (or rather, the US) and Russia. Albanians should try to get German understanding by making parallels between the position of Kosovo and the position of the Sudetenland region. However, they should be careful to make this comparison only in personal contacts with German politicians and opinion-makers, because public comparisons of this kind would be counter-productive in the countries that won World War II."

3."France has shown more understanding for the Kosovar position and greater distance from Serbia than expected. It’s possible that the outcome of the Presidential elections in May this year in France will influence the stand of this country towards Kosovo. The likely winner of these elections, according to the newest opinion polls, Nicolas Sarkozy, is known as being close to the US (not a widespread position in France), and his victory could result in an even more supportive stance of France towards Kosovo’s independence."

4. "Great Britain is the biggest supporter of Kosovo since 1998. It has spoken out in favour of military intervention against Serbia as early as in June 1998 exerting influence on Washington to decide in favour of military action, it was the only country willing to commit its troops for the ground invasion during the NATO air campaign in 1999 and it is the Contact Group member which is the most supportive to Kosovo’s independence. Credit for such a British stance goes to Prime Minister Tony Blair who will resign this year. The question is now what stand his likely successor Gordon Brown will take who is reportedly less close to the US and closer to EU than Mr Blair. A turnaround in the British position is certainly out of question, yet some modifications are possible. It’s possible that a somewhat less warm British attitude towards Kosovo would be compensated with a more sympathetic stance of France in case of Sarkozy’s victory."

5. "Turkey is an important state in NATO as well as an influential one in the Islamic world. Its position towards Kosovo’s problem is ambivalent. On the one hand, Turkey opposes policies favouring the interests of minorities, least of all the right to secession, because of its Kurdish problem and this element makes Turkey opposed to Kosovar independence. On the
other hand, Turkey has interests in the Balkans and Muslim populations in the region Islamised by the Ottoman Empire are seen as natural bases for Turkish influence in the region. In this respect, the vision of the Kosovar state with Muslim majority and special relations with Turkey could be the reason for Turkish support for Kosovo’s independence. It’s known that Turkey acts as a patron of Bosniaks, yet it’s difficult to see Turks in the same position when it comes to Kosovar Albanians because the position of Bosniaks and Albanians is not the same. Not only because not all Albanians are Muslims but even more because the history of both peoples and their attitude towards the Ottoman period are different. For having Turkish support it is necessary for Kosovars to do their best that Kosovo Turks feel at home in Kosovo.

6."In the underdeveloped world of Asia, Africa and Central and South America, Kosovars should try to enlist support for their cause by drawing a parallel between
their struggle for independence and the decolonisation process in the Third World during which their countries became independent."

7. "Kosovars have every right to play on Islamic solidarity for getting international support, yet this should be done in a discreet way so as not to provide ammunition to those enemies who portray an independent Kosovo as a future Al-Qaeda stronghold in Europe, etc. On the other hand, Kosovars could make use of the fear of Islamic extremism in the West by exerting pressure on the Western countries. It should be told to the West that non-recognition of independent Kosovo could push some disappointed Kosovars into the hands of Islamic extremists and weaken pro-European forces among Kosovars"

8."Outside Europe, the US is the most important supporter of Kosovo’s independence. However, American support is not unconditional and there are also opponents of independent Kosovo in the public and political life in the US. Moreover, it seems that Albanians sometimes overestimate the importance of this support and foreign support in general. The US’ support is only political, the US won’t wage another war for Kosovo".

En el text es dóna per suposat que Rússia és una aliada ferma de Sèrbia, i en conseqüència, contrària a la sobirania de Kosovo.

Val a dir que trobo a faltar referències als posicionaments de la Xina -un altre membre amb poder de veto al Consell de Seguretat de l'ONU- i d'Israel. Caldrà seguir d'aprop tot el procés negociador.